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Are World Incomes Converging?
According to traditional theories of economic
growth, incomes in developing countries should
eventually catch up to those in industrial coun-
tries. The reason is that since capital is scarce in
developing countries, capital will be more pro-
ductive there, or rates of return on investment
will be higher, than in industrial countries. To the
extent higher rates of return spur greater capital
investment and growth, income differences be-
tween developing and industrial countries should
narrow. However, excepting a group of rapidly
growing developing economies, the prediction
of convergence has generally not been fulfilled.
This Weekly Letter examines the issue of con-
vergence by reviewing differences in growth
performance among developing countries, and
discussing the characteristics of high growth
economies that may account for their relatively
better performance.
Growth performance
Figure 1 compares real GDP growth for high-
growth, middle-growth, and low-growth develop-
ing economies over two periods, 1971-1981 and
1982-1992. The growth classifications are from
the International Monetary Fund (1993). Ninety
countries are covered, with the "high-growth"
group consisting ofthe top third, and so on. The
growth rates in each category are weighted aver-
ages, with weights based on 1981-1984 purchas-
ing power parity valuation of country GDPs.
Many East Asian countries are in the high-growth
category; African economies, notably in the
drought-stricken sub-Saharan region, figure
prominently among the low-growth countries. For
reference, the figure also shows the growth rate
of industrial countries.
Figure 1 shows that growth rates in the high-growth
group consistently exceed those of the industrial
countries. As a result, the gap between the in-
comes of the high-growth group and ofthe
industrial countries has narrowed significantly
since 1971. In contrast, incomes of the middle-
growth countries were converging to those of the
industrial economies in the 1970s, but conver-
gence stalled in the 1980s. As for the low-growth
countries, their performance was so poor that the
gap between their GDPs and those of industrial
countries widened between 1971 and 1992.











• Highgrowth 0 Midgrowth III Lowgrowth Ia Industrial
Investment and savings
Traditional growth models relate economic
growth to factors of production, such as capital
and labor, as well as productivity. One implica-
tion of these models is that developing econo-
mies will grow faster because of higher rates of
capital investment. Indeed, Levine and Renelt,
1992, find that the relationship between invest-
ment shares and growth rates is robust under
many econometric specifications.
Figure 2 illustrates the share of investment and
saving relative to output in the three groups of
developing economies. Two features of the data
stand out: (i) over the past two decades, on av-
erage the shares of investment and saving are
higher in the high-growth economies; (ii) both
investment and savings shares remained high
in the high-growth economies across time, but in
the middle-growth and low-growth countries, in-
vestment and saving shares fell in the 1982-1992
period. One plausible interpretation of Figure 2
is that high rates of investment require high rates
of saving.
In theory, high rates ofdomestic saving are not
needed to finance investment if foreign capital














25 available. In practice, however, foreign capital of-
ten is not available to low-income economies. In
some cases, the environment for foreign investors
has not been hospitable; in other cases foreign
investors have been deterred by the difficulties in
repatriating profits or in securing repayments on
external debts. This was particularly true after
1982, when the international debt crisis led to
cutbacks in international financing for middle-
and low-growth economies. Such cutbacks in
turn caused the decline in their investment
shares after 1982.
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The reasons why high-growth economies save a
lot are not fully understood. However, observa-
tion of the high-growth economies in East Asia
suggests that countries with high national savings
adopted stable macroeconomic policies, and in
particular avoided incurring large government
budget deficits. These stable macroeconomic
policies may have raised the expected return on
investment and reduced the perceived risk of
such investment.
Productivity and exports
As Figure 2 illustrates, while all three groups of
developing countries had rates of investment
around 21 percent of GOP in the 1970s, real
GOP growth in the high-growth economies sig-
nificantly outstripped growth in the other econo-
mies. This suggests that growth depends on more
than investment. Productivity improvements are
another important ingredient.
To shed some Iight on the role of productivity, the
left side of Figure 3 reports the contribution of to-
tal factor productivity to output growth using a
growth-accounting framework (IMF, 1993) over
the period 1971-1991. Total factor productivity is
measured by the residual portion of trend output
growth that is not explained by increases in fac-
tors of production (labor and capital). The con-
tribution of total factor productivity to growth in
the high growth economies was (i) much larger
than in the other developing economies and (ii)
stable over the two subperiods. In contrast, the
growth in total factor productivity fell sharply in
the middle-growth economies and turned nega-
tive in the low-growth economies after 1982.
Some of the earlier growth models provide little
insight on the sources of productivity growth, but
recent research has made some progress in im-
proving our understanding. In a lucid essay,
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Robert Lucas (1993) discusses new models where
the accumulation of human capital or knowledge
is the main engine of growth and productivity in-
creases. Such accumulation occurs in a number
of ways, but largely through learning on the job.
Lucas illustrates how such learning affects pro-
ductivity by citing the production of Liberty ships
during World War II. As shipyards acquired expe-
rience, industry output per man hour increased
at a 40 percent annual rate over a three-year-
period. In any given industry, such remarkable
productivity gains will level off after a while.
However, the greater productivity (through learn-
ing) acquired in making a product may make it
profitable to invest in making new, perhaps more
sophisticated, products. Such investment might
not have been profitable if workers had been less
productive. Thus, experience in a given industry
may provide the basis for entering new industries
where productivity gains will again be substan-
tial as the new production processes are mas-
tered. In this manner, a high-growth economy
may exhibit very large and sustained productivity
gains as its workers and firms continuously enter
new lines of production.
Lucas conjectures that productivity growth is
more rapid in high-growth economies because
these economies succeed in continuously moving
the work force from less to more sophisticated
products. These economies rapidly accumulate
human capital "through the high learning rates
associated with new activities, and through the
spillover ofthis experience to the production of
still newer goods" (page 267).
While more work is needed to develop and test
Lucas's conjecture, the data on exports appear to








incentive to produce for the protected domestic
market and because trade barriers raise the cost
of inputs that might be used for exports. Success-
ful economies have avoided these adverse effects
by (i) eliminating trade barriers (Hong Kong and
Singapore, for example, or (ii) shielding the ex-
port sector from the effects of trade barriers
through subsidies or other means (Taiwan and
Korea, for example). Of these two approaches,
eliminating trade barriers is preferable. One rea-
son is that the use of export subsidies can be
costly, as unsuccessful industries may be sub-
sidized. Another reason is that in today's interna-
tional trading environment, the use of export
subsidies is likely to be unacceptable to trading
partners.
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The experiences ofthe East Asian economies also
clarify what policies will foster competitive ex-
porters. Countries with high trade barriers tend
to be poor exporters, because producers have an
new product lines is likely to require large mar-
kets, and since domestic markets in many high-
growth economies are small, Lucas's framework
implies that high-growth economies should expe-
rience very rapid rates of export growth. This
high growth in exports is apparent in the right
hand side of Figure 3.
Also, the composition of exports should shift to
more sophisticated (manufactured) products.
Indeed, rapid export growth in the high-growth
economies was accompanied by significant in-
creases in the share of manufactured goods in
total nonfuel exports. For example, in East Asia
and the Pacific, this share rose from 33 percent
to 72 percent between 1970 and 1991. In addi-
tion, the types of manufactured goods produced
by high-growth economies have changed over
time, from labor-intensive goods requiring rela-
tively little technological know-how, to capital-
intensive or knowledge-intensive goods. Since
the growth in exports depends on the human
capital already accumulated through past export
production, this framework also helps explain
why exports in high-growth economies consis-
tently grew more rapidly than in other develop-
ing economies.
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Conclusions
Our review of the experiences of developing
countries over the past two decades suggest that
the incomesofhigh-growth developingeconomies
have tended to converge to those of industrial
economies because of (i) high rates of investment
that appear to depend on high rates of domestic
saving; and (ii) rapid productivity growth that ap-
pears to reflect the learning effects resulting from
fast export growth, and significant changes in the
composition of such exports. Countries wishing
to grow rapidly should therefore exercise fiscal
restraint in order to promote high rates of na-
tional savings, which will in turn support invest-
ment. They should also eliminate trade barriers,
so as to develop a competitive export sector that
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December.